Capturing Economic Rents From Resources Through Royalties and Taxes by Mintz, Jack M. & Chen, Duanjie
www.pol icyschool.ca
Volume 5•Issue 30• October 2012
CAPTURING ECONOMIC RENTS
FROM RESOURCES THROUGH
ROYALTIES AND TAXES  
Jack Mintz and Duanjie Chen†
SUMMARY
Oil price fluctuations, concerns over the division of resource revenues, and unconventional oil
and gas developments are forcing governments to confront the same issue: how to design
optimal royalty and corporate tax systems that bring in a publicly acceptable share of revenues
without discouraging private investment.
This paper surveys tax and royalty systems across six countries, as well as four US states and
five Canadian provinces, offering concise analyses of their strengths and shortcomings to
describe the best and simplest approaches to both.
As in a public-private partnership, government owns the resources and allows private agents to
maximize the rents resources generate. An optimal royalty system will thus be rent-based,
ensuring that both owner and agent obtain maximally competitive returns so that each has
incentives to continue the partnership. Such a system will also be simple, making compliance
easy, manipulation difficult, and risks affordable. And it will be stable, instilling in the private
sector the confidence needed to invest for the long term.
As for corporate income taxes, they should be neutral across business activities, and applied at
equal effective rates on economic income, to avoid distorting market forces through subsidies
or needless complexity.
A clean rent-based tax that allows all costs incurred by producers to be expensed or carried
over, along with a corporate income tax system shorn of many of the preferences that negatively
affect business activity, should be the way forward for any government looking to update their
fiscal regimes for the 21st century. 
†Jack Mintz is the Palmer Chair of Public Policy and Duanjie Chen is a Research Fellow at The
School of Public Policy. Prepared for the PWC Tax Policy Roundtable at The School of Public Policy,
University of Calgary, February 29, 2012. We wish to thank Philip Daniel, Tom Huffaker, Greg
Melchin, Angelo Toselli, participants of the Roundtable and an anonymous referee for excellent
comments that have materially improved this paper. We also wish to thank Stephen Richardson and
David Sewell for their comments.
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SAISIR LA RENTE ÉCONOMIQUE 
DES RESSOURCES AU MOYEN DE 
REDEVANCES ET DE TAXES
Jack Mintz et Duanjie Chen†
RÉSUMÉ
Les fluctuations du prix du pétrole, les préoccupations sur la division des revenus des ressources 
et l’exploitation non conventionnelle du pétrole et du gaz forcent les gouvernements à se poser 
la même question : comment concevoir des systèmes de redevances et d’impôts qui offrent des 
revenus acceptables pour la population sans décourager l’investissement privé?
Cet article porte sur les systèmes d’impôts et de redevances dans six pays, quatre États 
américains et cinq provinces canadiennes, et propose des analyses concises des forces et des 
faiblesses de chacun dans le but de définir les approches les plus simples et les plus efficaces.
Comme dans les partenariats publics-privés, les ressources appartiennent au gouvernement 
qui permet à des exploitants privés de maximiser les rentes que ces ressources génèrent. Par 
conséquent, un système de redevances optimal est axé sur les rentes pour que le propriétaire 
et l’exploitant obtiennent tous deux d’excellents rendements qui militent en faveur du maintien 
leur association. Un tel système est simple, ses règles sont faciles à suivre, on peut difficilement 
le manipuler et les risques sont abordables. En plus, il est stable et inspire aux intervenants du 
secteur privé la confiance dont ils ont besoin pour investir à long terme.
En ce qui a trait aux impôts des sociétés, ils doivent être neutres pour l’ensemble des activités 
d’entreprise et être appliqués à des taux réels égaux sur le revenu économique pour éviter de 
fausser le marché par des subsides ou une trop grande complexité.
Un gouvernement qui envisage d’améliorer son système fiscal pour le 21e siècle devrait 
opter pour un impôt bien défini axé sur la rente, qui permet à tous les coûts assumés par les 
producteurs d’être passés en charges ou reportés, conjugué à un régime fiscal des entreprises 
amputé de bon nombre des avantages qui se répercutent négativement sur les affaires.
† Jack Mintz est titulaire de la Chaire Palmer d’études des politiques publiques et Duanjie Chen est chercheuse à l’École de 
politiques publiques. Préparé pour la table ronde sur la politique fiscale de PWC à l’École de politiques publiques, Université de 
Calgary, le 29 février 2012. Nous souhaitons remercier Philip Daniel, Tom Huffaker, Greg Melchin, Angelo Toselli, les participants 
à la table ronde et un lecteur anonyme pour leurs excellents commentaires qui ont sensiblement amélioré cet article. Nous 
remercions aussi Stephen Richardson et David Sewell pour leurs remarques.
INTRODUCTION
Owing to the unpredictable fluctuation of oil prices over recent years, the debate on and
resulting reform of the fiscal regimes targeting the oil industry around the world has heated up
and yet remains understandably unsettling. Examples demonstrating such unsettling patterns
include the most recent reforms in Canada (Alberta) and Australia. 
Further, new unconventional sources of oil and gas deposits have become economically feasible
to produce, such as the oil sands and shale gas. Governments with access to new revenue
sources are developing royalty systems that capture rents without unduly discouraging extractive
resource developments.
This paper is aimed at searching for the optimal fiscal regime towards the oil and gas industry
by comparatively evaluating such regimes in several major oil-producing countries. This is a
daunting task given that risks in international comparisons of fiscal regimes concerning the oil
and gas industry are abundant, among which “misinterpretation of individual fiscal regimes”
might be the most dangerous.1 We therefore limit our study only to those regimes for which the
description is unambiguously provided on government websites, so that our interpretation of a
given fiscal regime may be relatively easy to verify. With this limitation, our study covers only
the following six countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada (five provinces), Norway, the United
Kingdom and the United States (four states). 
Many other countries that are rich in oil and gas resources are excluded from our study. They
include Iraq, Kuwait, Mexico and Saudi Arabia, which together account for over 30 percent of
world output. Production of oil and gas in these countries is exclusively undertaken by national
oil companies or even by the government itself.2 Therefore, for non-government-owned oil
industry in these countries, there is no fiscal regime that is sufficiently transparent to be
compared to that elsewhere.
In our study, we look at the impact of both taxes and the royalties of various fiscal regimes on
investment decisions. It is critical to understand the nature of potential economic effects since
resources themselves do not move, and therefore royalties and taxes on economic rents —
income in excess of returns paid to attract capital and labour for resource development — are a
more efficient form of taxation. However, capital and profits, which are particularly mobile, do
move, so royalties that discourage investments by resource companies could result in less
development (with the resources being left for future extraction). 
1 See Phillip Daniel, et al, “Evaluating Fiscal Regimes for Resource Projects: An Example from Oil Development,” in
The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice (Routledge Explorations in
Environmental Economics), May 10, 2010, in which the stated risks include “misinterpretation of individual fiscal
regimes, differences in treatment of indirect taxes, inconsistency of ring-fencing rules, issues of incremental
investments, and interaction between host country tax systems and home country systems of investing companies.”
2 Ibid. 
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It is becoming imperative, however, for oil-producing provinces in Canada and elsewhere to
have a closer look at the structure of royalty regimes in order to update them for the 21st
century. Most oil-producing countries in the industrialized world, including Australia, Norway
and the United Kingdom, have moved towards net-profit or rent-based regimes for oil and gas
production. Under a rent-based regime, current and capital costs are deductible from revenues
(with any unused deductions being carried forward at the appropriate interest rate, reflecting
the fact that the government shares returns, risk and investment costs with the private sector).
Despite some important limitations to rent-based regimes (particularly with respect to
information on costs), a rent-based royalty has worked well in oil sands production in Alberta.
We argue that this royalty structure, with the exclusion of its price-sensitivity, is an appropriate
rent-based payment for other jurisdictions to consider as a rent-collection device. 
Another critical issue is the tax treatment of oil and gas industries under the corporate income
tax. Corporate taxation has become a focus in recent years since governments are considering
whether to remove so-called fossil fuel “subsidies.” We evaluate the neutrality of the corporate
income tax provisions in terms of applying similar tax burdens across industries, including the
tax treatment of intangible expenditures such as research and exploration. We argue that the
corporate income tax should apply to a tax base reflecting economic income, except in those
cases in which firms are unable to fully appropriate returns from discovery investments (such
as research and exploration). In this case, discovery might be provided a more favourable
treatment, although we do not estimate the optimal level of subsidy.
We specifically find that several oil and gas tax and royalty systems discourage investment
relative to other industries. This is especially so when considering the interaction between the
income tax and the royalty provisions that leads to high tax and royalty burdens on marginal
investments, since few royalty structures are strictly rent-based. Thus, fossil fuel subsidies are
more apparent than real in several cases.3 In other cases, oil investments are provided a more
favourable regime for investments, which typically arises from favourable royalty and
corporate tax provisions for exploration and development. 
This report is developed as follows. In the next section, we discuss the principles underlying an
optimal royalty and corporate income tax policy for a government. This is followed by a
conceptual discussion of the marginal effective tax and royalty rate (METRR) as it would
apply to the oil industry. We then examine the royalty regimes in Canada in comparison with
the five oil-producing countries mentioned above, first with a brief description of their
statutory provisions, and then a METRR analysis in terms of fiscal impact on the oil industry
and the interaction between oil-specific levies (including royalties and rent taxes) and income
taxes. The final section concludes our study.  
Appendices are provided to describe theoretical derivations (Appendix A), tax and non-tax
parameters by jurisdiction as used in our METRR models (Appendix B), and country-specific
METRR models (Appendices C - E).
3 For an elaboration of these points, see Kenneth J. McKenzie and Jack M. Mintz, “The Tricky Art of Measuring
Fossil Fuel Subsidies: A Critique of Existing Studies,” SPP Research Papers, Vol. 4, No. 14, September. 2011.
2
3OPTIMAL ROYALTY DESIGN
Royalty design is a complex subject since governments around the world extract a share of the
rents by using various approaches. These approaches take into account various factors
including revenues, investments and information, especially with regard to production costs.
A common royalty is a payment either based on a share of gross output, or revenues of a non-
renewable resource project for the provision of goods or services below market value.
However, the price is not set by the market since royalty rates are set by governments — there
is no market-determined royalty rate that is the analog of a market price. Indeed, there is no
necessity that governments use royalties as commonly understood to collect a payment as in
the private sector. Governments can, and do, use other mechanisms.  
In recent years, provinces have been resorting increasingly to net-profit systems, by which
costs are deductible in some form in determining the royalty base, rather than a conventional
royalty based on a percentage of production revenues. Provincial mining taxes are applied to
profits gross of interest deductions. Some provinces have adopted a resource royalty or mining
tax based on rents, typically measured as revenue net of current and capital expenditures (an
investment allowance is provided to carry forward unused deductions at a rate of interest to
preserve the time value of money). In the oil sector the obvious example is the net cash flow
tax applied to oil sands, which is a form of rent tax. Provinces also use bonus bids for land
tracts to raise revenue. Bonus bids effectively tax rents.
Economic rent arises from non-reproducible (or fixed) factors of production such as
entrepreneurship, land and natural resources. It can also arise due to the presence of natural or
artificial barriers to entry that generate market power, and special advantages that firms may
possess (such as location, patents, etc.). More generally, rent is the surplus value of a resource
after all costs, including opportunity costs, are subtracted from revenues arising from the sale
of goods and services. Rent is thus measured as the difference between the price at which a
resource can be sold and its discovery, extraction, and production costs, including a rate of
return on capital that can be obtained by investing in projects with similar risk and scale.  
Any tax or levy applied to pure economic rent will not distort the use of capital or other
production factors. At the margin, firms employ capital, labour and other factors until the
marginal return4 on the last unit employed is equal to its economic costs. In economic terms,
rents are zero at the margin, negative if too much production takes place and positive if too
little rent-earning production is undertaken by the producer. Hence, for marginal decisions —
investment or otherwise — the rent earned is zero, as returns equal costs in using production
factors. A pure rent-based tax will neither discourage nor encourage the investment or
production decision, since the levy is neutral in that it does not affect investment and
technology decisions.  
4 More formerly, the marginal return is equal to the marginal gross revenue earned from employing one more unit of
the factor net of the scarcity value of extracting the resource.  
In most situations around the world, governments are typically owners of the resource
(freehold ownership does arise in Canada and the United States, which is not the focus here).
The relationship between the government as owner of the resource and the private producer is
similar to a public-private partnership. The government is the principal owner and the private
company is the agent brought in to maximize the amount of rents that can be generated by the
non-renewable resource project. The assessment of royalty policy is based on several critical
factors:  
• Government ownership: As the owner of the natural resource, the government is entitled to the
rents accruing to the project. Some of the rents may be associated with entrepreneurship or
land, and therefore accrue to private producers and landowners with the government
receiving the remainder.
• Competitive return for private investors: As the agent, the private producer and its investors
must be provided a risk-adjusted rate of return on capital that is at least as much as what is
available elsewhere to have sufficient incentive to invest in the project. To attract the best
producers, the government gives up some of its share of rents.5
• Efficiency: The royalty structure should be devised to maximize rents available to both the
public owner and the private producer. A rent-based royalty achieves a maximum amount of
rents being earned by the public and private partners since production, investment,
exploration and development are sufficiently profitable with and without the royalty. 
• Simplicity:6 The royalty structure should be simple and hence easy to comply with and hard
to manipulate. The unique risk associated with upstream oil investment and production does
not warrant complexity in royalty design.
• Stability: Royalty regimes can exacerbate uncertainty if they are not properly designed.
When resource prices are high, governments may not feel they receive their share of rents,
resulting in royalty hikes. When prices fall, the governments might look at providing new
incentives, finding them too rich once the economy recovers. To minimize political risk for
private investors, it is appropriate for the government to choose a royalty structure that
provides both sufficient incentive for investment and revenues for government without
changing public policy on a continuous basis.
These five principles are simple to consider for royalty design and lead to a very specific
recommendation: the optimal royalty is a rent-based one so as to maximize economic rents.  
Nonetheless, there are various other issues that could be considered in designing the optimal
royalty system.   
5 In principal-agent models, the principal does not know the most cost-efficient producers. It therefore designs a
contract to attract the best agent to produce the resource. This requires the government to share some of the rents
with the producer.
6 We thank Tom Huffaker for suggesting this additional criterion, which has been one of the well-established criteria
for designing and assessing a tax regime in general.
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The first is that a government might wish to reduce extraction if the social discount rate in
determining the benefits accruing to future generations is less than the private discount rate for
determining profitability. In this case, a rent-based royalty will not be socially efficient since
too much production and investment takes place. Therefore, some other sort of mechanism
might be used to discourage investment, including regulation or corporate taxation, or through
the royalty itself, if a government wishes to have slower development of resources than would
be determined by a market. This is very much a political judgement, since social discount rates
reflect social or political preferences and are subject to value judgement.   
Second, non-renewable resource production can have an impact on the use of clean air, water
and land. Royalties could be adjusted to reward good environmental behaviour. On the other
hand, other economic instruments are better suited to control the environment, since they are
specifically directed at the problem. Examples would be production-related environmental
taxes to cost emissions and regulations, and reclamation funds when the mine is terminated
(supported by tax-assisted trust rules).   
Third, it is critical to recognize that governments not only collect royalties or other specific
resource-specific charges; they also collect corporate income taxes, capital taxes and other
capital-related levies. These taxes add to investment costs and reduce the return to capital
earned by the investor. In some jurisdictions, such as Norway and the United Kingdom, the
resource royalty is explicitly recognized as part of the corporate income tax and levied as an
additional corporate tax on the industry. In most jurisdictions, however, royalties are treated as
separate levies from the corporate income tax. Regardless, any analysis of a royalty system
should account for its interaction with the corporate income tax. As shown in Appendix A for
interested readers, a rent-based royalty system is not neutral with respect to investment, since
the government does not share the corporate tax burden with investors — investments are
discouraged as a result when a rent-based royalty is superimposed on a corporate income tax.7
Fourth, a government, in contracting with private producers to extract non-renewable
resources, may not have full information about costs of production in determining the rent-
based royalty payment. Many governments often use a revenue-based or gross royalty
consisting of price- and production-sensitive royalty rates applied to gross production or
special drilling credits, arguably as a result of informational deficiencies in measuring costs.
Nonetheless, in setting the conventional royalty rate, it is necessary to know something about
costs (which is also obtainable under the corporate tax) so the informational requirements are
not avoidable.
7 To make the royalty truly rent-based, two adjustments would be needed when royalties are deductible from the
corporate income tax. The first is that capital cost and depletion allowances under the corporate tax should be based
on the cost of investment net of the government’s royalty share of the cost. The second is the provision of an
investment tax credit that is needed to offset the grinding down of cost deductions from the rent-based royalty (the
credit rate would be equal to the royalty rate multiplied by the corporate income tax rate). Combining the two
adjustments, the overall marginal effective tax and royalty rate on capital investments would be reduced in value.
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The rationale for production- and price-sensitive revenue-based or gross royalties lies in the
notion of economic rent. By their nature, revenue-based royalties do not constitute a tax on
economic rent because they are levied on gross production or revenue, with no deduction for
costs. As such, royalties are by their nature distortionary, and indeed discourage investment and
production in the oil and gas industry. Higher prices will result in higher rent margins so that
revenue-based royalties are adjusted upwards. On a per-unit-of-production basis, a high-
production well will have lower costs than a small-production well. Higher royalty rates on
high-production wells (or rather the converse of lower royalty rates on low production wells)
are therefore an imperfect attempt to incorporate costs into a gross royalty system and
approximate a levy on rent.
In some situations, governments may have so little information about costs that a rent-based
royalty is impractical. If royalties are collected well by well, it is administratively costly to
collect royalties based on rents that would allow a deduction for well costs. For informational
reasons, private landowners would more likely use a revenue-based royalty, since they do not
have access to cost data.  
In practice, governments have good access to information on costs, since they have the ability
to audit financial data provided by companies. Nonetheless, some limitations might be imposed
on cost deductions. For example, many rent-based systems do not allow overhead costs to be
deducted since a government cannot observe how much these costs can be attributed to the
project being developed. Instead, a rough adjustment through an uplift factor on costs might be
used.   
With rent-based royalties, governments can protect their interests by requiring minimum
payments based on revenues; this arrangement is typically found in profit-sensitive royalty
systems in Canada and abroad. The minimum royalty does impose some risk on private
producers since government shares the upside in profits but not the downside. However, it can
be an acceptable trade-off when governments do not have full access to information.    
Governments can obtain petroleum revenues on a rent basis in two ways. The first is to auction
off the right to explore, develop and extract resources from land. The second is to assess a rent-
based royalty on rents or cash flows earned by the resource firm. The first method is an ex ante
approach, whereby the revenues are obtained prior to knowledge about the size of the resource
pool. The second approach is an ex post approach to collecting rents once the known resource
is found and extracted. In many countries, both ex ante and ex post approaches are used to
collect government revenues — greater reliance on the ex post reduces revenues from the
ex ante approach. For our analysis, both are reasonable approaches to collecting rents.  
To conclude, the rent-based royalty system is an appropriate way to collect rents while
minimizing economic distortions.
6
OPTIMAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX DESIGN
As reviewed by the Technical Committee on Business Taxation in 1997,8 the purpose of the
corporate income tax is threefold. It serves as a withholding tax on corporate income to shore
up personal taxes that cannot be applied uniformly on all sources of income, especially capital
gains. It also serves as a withholding tax on income paid to non-resident owners. And finally,
the corporate tax is a surrogate payment for the use of public services that are beneficial to the
profitability of businesses.
Given these three objectives, the corporate tax should be generally neutral across business
activities. This is best achieved by applying the corporate tax at equal effective tax rates on
economic income accruing to shareowners given the withholding role of corporate income to
ensure that equity income is taxed. Neutrality — similar tax treatment of business activities —
is an appropriate benchmark against which to assess the corporate income tax.  
A caveat to the principle of neutrality is the potential market failures that could arise with
respect to the economy-wide impacts of certain forms of business activities. For example,
businesses may underinvest in costly research and discovery since they cannot fully
appropriate the returns that also accrue to other businesses that do not pay for the costs. Or
businesses might overinvest in some activities that cause environmental damage, and their
investments should therefore be discouraged by higher effective tax rates on capital. While an
argument might be made to adjust corporate tax policies to account for these market
distortions, corporate tax policy is not the best mechanism to correct market failures compared
to regulations, public expenditure programs and other tax or subsidy remedies.   
As a general principle, neutral corporate taxation of the oil and gas industry would imply a
similar corporate tax rate on resource profits as other business activities. Pre-production and
post-production capital expenditures should be treated similarly. This would imply that capital
deductions for investments in real assets should reflect the replacement cost of depreciating
and depleting assets. Given that intangible expenditures on exploration and development are
incurred prior to the realization of income in later years, such expenditures should be
capitalized and written off once reserves are made ready for extraction and income is
generated.  
As discussed above, exploration expenditures are akin to research, to the extent that such
activities are essentially about information and knowledge acquisition. There are typically
thought to be spillovers associated with the generation of information and knowledge. These
spillovers mean that the information discovered or acquired by one firm generates information,
and therefore uncompensated benefits, to others. Without government grants or tax preferences,
information and knowledge acquisition would be too low, since businesses do not fully
appropriate social returns on their investments. This provides a policy rationale for subsidizing
knowledge acquisition, which becomes a typical justification for the R&D tax credit that is
available to all corporations. A similar point may be made with regard to exploration (but
perhaps not development) in the resource sector. For example, the discovery (or not) of oil or
gas in a particular region most certainly conveys information to other companies that is not 
8 Technical Committee on Business Taxation, Report, Department of Finance, Ottawa, 1997, Chapter 1.
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properly internalized. While one can debate the size of these informational spillovers, on their
own and in comparison to spillovers from R&D more generally, it seems indisputable that they
exist. Ideally, any subsidy to account for informational spillovers due to either R&D or
exploration should be based upon the size of those spillovers. In reality, the size of spillovers is
rarely measurable, such that the only base for subsidy is the size of expenditure itself on
research or exploration.
As a final note, Canada and many other countries have provided special tax concessions for
research expenditures as well as exploration, both forms of discovery expenditures.
Environmental degradation is typically dealt with by other policies such as regulation and
environmental taxation, although some corporate tax preferences are given for investments in
environmental cost-reducing technologies.
MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATES (METRRS)
Using a rent-based royalty as the benchmark, we evaluate the impact of corporate, sales and
other taxes on investments in oil and gas. Corporate income taxes, capital taxes and sales taxes
on capital purchases clearly affect the investment decision. In this section, we provide a
heuristic explanation of the marginal effective tax and royalty rate (METRR),9 which is the
technical indicator showing the impact of fiscal regimes on investment in the industry. 
Conceptually, a business invests in capital until the rate of return on incremental dollars is
equal to the cost of capital (at this point no further rents are earned). To measure the effect of
taxes and royalties on investment decisions in the oil industry, we calculate the marginal
effective tax and royalty rate as the amount of taxes and royalties paid as a percentage of the
pre-tax-and-royalty return on capital that would be required to cover taxes, royalties, and the
financing of capital with debt and equity. For example, if a business invests in capital at the
margin, that yields a pre-tax-and-royalty net-of-risk rate of return equal to 15 percent and, after
taxes and royalties, a net-of-risk rate of return equal to five percent, so the METRR is 15
percent minus five percent divided by 15 percent, giving a result of 67 percent.10
Risk is incorporated in the analysis by measuring the risk-adjusted rate of return on capital. To
the extent that the tax or royalty system shares risks with producers by allowing for
refundability of losses, the government provides an implicit deduction for the cost of risk.11
9 This discussion is based on J. Mintz and D. Chen, “Taxing Canada’s Cash Cow: Tax and Royalty Burdens on Oil and
Gas Investments,” SPP Briefing Paper, 3(3), The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, 2010.
10 To be clear, we are not assuming five percent is the after-tax rate of return (net of risk) for a project.  The after-tax
rates of return are based on a modelling of capital market equilibrium for observable interest rates and equity costs.
11 This proposition is well known in the literature, which implies that the risk premium from capital asset pricing
models is reduced by the factor one minus the tax rate (see Roger Gordon and John D. Wilson, “Measuring the
Efficiency Cost of Taxing Risky Capital Income,” American Economic Review, 79(3), 1989, 427-39 and J. Mintz,
“The Corporate Income Tax: A Survey,” Fiscal Studies, 16(4), 23-68, 1996). In a recent critique of our analysis of the
Newfoundland & Labrador offshore royalty system, it was misunderstood that we had already fully incorporated
income risk in our analysis of marginal effective tax rates on resource projects (W. Locke, “Do Newfoundland and
Labrador Royalties Fully Subsidize Oil and Gas Investments: An Independent of an Assessment of Claims Made in
Mintz and Chen (2010) and Mintz (2010),” The Harris Centre, Memorial University, 2010).
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Many rent-based royalties enable companies to carry forward unused deductions at a rate of
interest. This enables companies to preserve the time value of their deductions and moves the
system closer to full-loss refundability. Since full-loss refundability implies that governments
share income and capital risk with the private producer, it also implies that the appropriate carry-
forward rate for unused deduction should be a riskless interest rate, such as a long-term
government bond interest rate.12 This issue has been contentious in some countries where private
producers have argued for discount rates that reflect those used for investment project analysis —
yet the discount rates are too high, since they incorporate risk already shared by the government
through loss offsets. This point will be further discussed below, especially with regard to
Australian, Newfoundland & Labrador and Nova Scotia oil and gas investments.
BOX A:  A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF A RENT-BASED ROYALTY
The rent-based royalty provides a full deduction for current and capital costs. It is neutral
with respect to investment decisions, since only revenues in excess of economic costs are
subject to the rent-based royalty.  
When a loss is incurred, the government could refund the loss at the royalty rate, or
alternatively allow the loss to be carried forward at a rate of interest to preserve the value
of the deduction as if it were refunded immediately.
To understand the mechanics of both approaches to the rent-based royalty, the following
example is provided. In this example, positive rents are earned in that the present value of
pre-royalty cash flows (discounted at a five-percent rate) is equal to $15329 (if it were a
project that was just sufficiently profitable (marginal), it would have discounted cash flows
equal to zero).
(1) Carry-forward of unused deductions (losses) is at a five-percent rate.
(2) It is assumed the resource is exhausted at the end of year 5. Capital costs are non-recoverable.
The present value of royalty payments (arrived by discounting at five percent to compare
current and future periods of cash flow) can be computed for each case.  
If full refunds are provided each year a loss is incurred (the refund equal to the loss multiplied by
the royalty rate of 25 percent), the present value of royalty payments is equal to $3831, which
is exactly 25 percent of pre-royalty cash flows (hence a rent-based royalty).
Under the rent-based royalty without a full refund, any unused deductions are carried forward
at a rate of five percent to preserve the full value of the deduction (five percent being the
discount rate for comparing future values with the first year). For example, the loss of
$3000 is carried forward to the next year to be deducted from the royalty base. In addition,
$150 is provided a deduction equal to five percent multiplied by the loss carryover. The
latter amount is often referred to as the investment allowance.
The present value of royalty payments under the carry-forward method is equal to $3831 in
the above example, exactly equal to the full-refund royalty payment.
12 A similar point is made in the Mirrlees report. See Institute of Fiscal Studies, the Mirrlees Review, Tax By Design,
chapter 17, 2011. http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview/design. 
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Revenues $10000 $15000 $15000
Salary and other Current Costs ($1000) ($1000) ($3000) ($3000) ($3000)
Post-Production Capital ($2000) ($1000) ($1000)
Exploration and Development ($2000) ($4000)
Pre-Royalty Cash Flow (2) ($3000) ($5000) $5000 $11000 $11000
Royalty at 25% if Loss Refunded* ($750) ($1250) $1250 $2750 $2750
Carry-Forward (1) ($3150) ($8557) ($3735)
Royalty Base with Carry-Forward ($3000) ($8150) ($3557) $7265 $11000
Royalty with Carry-Forward of $1816 $2750
Unused Deductions (25%)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 (2)
It is important to understand that the METRR does not provide an estimate of the overall taxes
and royalties governments collect, since those amounts depend on both the marginal and infra-
marginal returns that projects earn. It is not unusual, for example, for the marginal effective tax
rate to be negative even though the government is collecting tax revenues. The implication is
that any losses for the marginal investment are being used to offset taxes paid on infra-
marginal returns, or carried forward to shelter income from royalties in the future.13 The
METRR is a benchmark with which to determine the effects of taxes and royalties on
investment decisions. If loss deductions cannot be fully utilized, the negative values would be
reduced (closer to zero).
As noted by others, resource projects are large capital-intensive projects with both fixed and
variable capital requirements. The tax system may not only discourage investment at the
margin but also the decision to invest at all. One should therefore consider not only the
marginal effective tax and royalty rate on capital allocation as we do, but also the overall tax
burden on total returns, which is typically used in cash flow project analysis. This point is
further discussed in the next section.   
The unique aspect of our work is its accounting for the time taken to develop non-renewable
resource projects before they are available for extraction.14 There are several stages of
production, including exploration and development phases to discover reserves and make them
available for extraction. With these two stages, the analysis is based on a flow of inputs to
develop a reserve available for production of oil and gas — a “time-to-build” analysis.15 The
following stage of production and extraction depletes the discovered reserves until exhaustion.
We do not consider the downstream processing stage in this study.
To derive the METRR for resource companies, we include exploration, development,
depreciable capital, and inventories. The analysis is based on calculating the present value of
income earned from projects that yield an annualized rate of return on capital. The gross-of-
tax-and-royalty rate of return on capital is equal to the inflation-adjusted cost of financing 
13 Locke, Ibid. Locke is further confused with our analysis by assuming that a project earns a six percent average rate
of return equal to the marginal rate of return (so infra-marginal returns are not earned by the project). It is important
to keep in mind that businesses invest until the pre-tax rate of return on capital is equal to the tax-adjusted cost of
capital (both measured net of risk), so that the average rate of return on capital in aggregate is more than the
marginal return. Our focus is on the impact of taxes and royalties on investment decisions (Mintz, 1996 ibid.).
14 Our modelling follows that found in Robin Boadway, Neil Bruce, and Jack Mintz, “Taxation, Inflation and the
Effective Marginal Tax Rate on Capital in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Economics 17 (1, 1984): 62-79; Robin
Boadway et al., “Marginal Effective Tax Rates for Capital in the Canadian Mining Industry,” Canadian Journal of
Economics 30 (1, 1987): 1-16; Jeffrey Mackie-Mason and Jack Mintz, “Corporate Taxation and the Building of
Capital: Implications for Expensing and Capitalization of Costs,” (mimeographed, University of Toronto, 1991); and
Kenneth J. McKenzie, Mario Mansour, and Ariane Brûlé, “The Calculation of Marginal Effective Tax Rates,”
Working Paper 1997-15 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1997). For details, see Mintz, “Measuring Effective Tax
Rates for Oil and Gas in Canada,” The School of Public Policy, SPP Technical Papers, March 2010.
15 The “time-to-build” analysis results in a higher cost of capital for a company, since its income is earned after
spending has taken place for a period of time. Tax payments are affected since tax deductions for exploration and
development spending are taken prior to income being earned when the resource is exploited. The delay in creating




capital (taking into account interest deductibility), adjusted for taxes. The net-of-tax-and-
royalty rate of return on capital is equal to the weighted average of the interest rate for debt,
and the imputed cost of equity finance provided by savers to fund the investment. The tax and
royalty the business pays is the difference between the gross-of-tax-and-royalty rate of return
on capital and the net-of-tax-and-royalty rate of return on capital. The METRR on capital is
equal to the tax and royalty paid divided by the gross-of-tax-and-royalty rate of return on
capital. 
The analysis includes corporate income taxes, rent-based taxes, royalties and the like (e.g., the
state severance tax in the US), capital-related, and sales taxes. We also take into account
various features of taxes, such as the valuation of inventories, capital-cost allowances, and the
investment tax credit (e.g., the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit, or AITC in Canada).
Appendix A provides a brief derivation of the equations used to estimate METRRs for non-
renewable resources in general. 
COMPARISON WITH AVERAGE TAX RATES STUDIES 
The marginal effective tax and royalty rate (METRR) results provide an indication as to how
the fiscal regimes would affect the allocation of oil investment. With marginal analysis, there is
no need to specify project revenues and costs, since companies will invest in capital until the
rate of return on capital is equal to the cost of capital. What we are required to do is to measure
the cost of capital with adjustments for taxes and royalties.16
There have been other studies that focus on average cash flows earned by the industry, which
requires a specification of revenues and costs that are best representative of the industry even
though they widely vary by project. Specific companies, in planning their investments, would
reasonably use their own revenues and costs based on the geological and other factors that
impact on their cash flows. Average effective tax and royalty rates are calculated as a share of
the internal rate of return earned on resource investment projects, which are typically above the
cost of capital used for marginal analysis.  
The average effective tax and royalty rate is quite sensitive to the internal rate of return. For
example, with a high internal rate of return, a fiscal regime with a high statutory rate and
accelerated cost deductions and tax credits could have an average effective tax and royalty rate
greater than the case of a regime with low rates and broad bases. With a low internal rate of
return, the opposite could hold if low rates and broad-based tax and royalty systems have a
smaller tax impact than high rates and narrow bases, since few rents are earned subject to the
adjusted internal rates of return equal to the observed cost of capital at the margin), the average
effective tax rate analysis could lead to a conclusion that a high-rate, narrow-base regime
imposes a higher tax burden on capital investments than a low-rate, broad-base regime with a
high internal rate of return on projects.
16 As described in Appendix A, we first derive the user cost of capital (gross of depreciation and risk in principle),
adjusted for royalties and taxes. The return on capital (net of risk) is equal to the user cost of capital net of
depreciation and risk. 
While it would be useful to understand how the marginal and average analyses compare —
often making little difference — the data needed for average tax rate analysis are more
demanding since risk-adjusted internal rates of return are specific to projects.17 Marginal
effective tax rate analysis requires a measurement of the cost of capital only since the pre-tax
and royalty (net-of-risk) rate of return on capital is equal to it.  
THE STATUTORY OIL FISCAL REGIME BY COUNTRY: AN OVERVIEW
Outside of direct government ownership, a tax/royalty regime that collects revenue from
private oil companies may involve three levies: “(1) a royalty to secure a minimum payment,
(2) the regular income tax that is applicable to all companies, and (3) a resource rent tax to
capture a large share of the profits of the most profitable projects.”18 Among the countries
under study, a given tax/royalty regime may consist of different combinations of these three
government levies and may involve either both a royalty and a rent tax or only one of them.
More interestingly, recent reforms (e.g., those undertaken by Australia, Norway, the UK and
Alberta for the oil sands) are converging towards application of a rent-based tax through which
the government shares both income risk and reward with the oil industry. In the meantime,
while Canada is struggling to strike a balance between encouraging resource investment and
collecting an appropriate share of oil rent, unreformed regimes still heavily rely on revenue-
based royalties (e.g., Brazil and the US).
Table 1 provides a summary of the statutory fiscal regime by country. Referring to this table,
we provide some observations below concerning the 13 regimes existing in six countries.  
17 Another type of analysis is to evaluate the effect of taxation on lumpy investments — this is the average effective tax
and royalty rate on capital by assuming a rate of return on capital in excess of the marginal rate of return (that equals
the cost of capital). The average rate of return (or internal rate of return), properly adjusted for risk, is however
unknown. We do know that companies will not invest in capital if they cannot cover both risk and the cost of capital.
18 Emil M. Sunley, et al, (2003) “Revenue from the Oil and Gas Sector: Issues and Country Experience,” pp. 153-183
in J.M. Davis, R. Ossowski and A. Fedelino (eds) Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing
Countries (International Monetary Fund: Washington D.C.).   
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TABLE 1  OIL AND GAS FISCAL STRUCTURE OF MAJOR PRODUCING JURISDICTIONS IN 2012 — A SUMMARY
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Jurisdiction Overview Company income tax Royalty Rent-based tax
Effective 1 July 2012,
there will be virtually
only two levies: the
general corporate
income tax (CIT) and
the petroleum resource






and the PRRT is
deductible for CIT
purposes.
In addition to the
regular corporate
income tax, there are
four main ad valorem
levies: a revenue-based





in R&D when there is
an SP charge payable.
There are also two
fixed-amount levies: the
rental fees and the
signature bonus. 
All the levies targeting
the oil industry except
SP are deductible for




tax purposes.  


















The corporate income tax
rate is currently 30












income tax rate is 34
percent including a 15
percent basic rate, a 10









to the normal tax
depreciation scheme.
The special tax provisions
include: a 100 percent
allowance for exploration
cost, a 30 percent annual
allowance for development
and a 25 percent
allowance for a special
class of depreciable
assets (Class 41),
covering a broad range of
assets used by the
resource sector.
Federal and state royalties vary by
region, but they are all creditable
against the petroleum resource rent
tax and hence have virtually no
impact on capital and business
allocation. 
The royalty is 10 percent on the
value of products sold, net of any
indirect taxes and transportation
costs using common carriers; 
The one percent landowner fee,
applicable to onshore activities only,
shares the same base as royalties. 
The rental fees are based on the
area of fields and location; the
signature bonus is a lump sum
payment due upon signing the
contract.
The federal government collects
royalties only from oil and gas
produced on the “frontier lands,”
including the “territorial sea” and
“continental shelf,” which are outside
the scope of this study. 
AG Petroleum Resource
Rent Tax (PRRT) on
offshore projects: the tax




expensed and may be
carried forward on an
uplift rate of 15
percentage points above
the government long-
term bond rate (LTBR).
Other capital expenditure
may be carried forward
at a rate of five percent
points above LTBR.
A special participation
(SP) fee is levied on
substantial profits (net of
all the other oil and gas
levies) that surpass the
threshold on a field-by-
field basis. The threshold
volume varies by location
(onshore or offshore, the
later is further
differentiated by water
depth) and declines with
the production years
(Year 1, 2, 3 and 4+). 
The SP rate is
progressive from 10






are treated as under CIT,
but “Brazil equipment” is
allowed a fast write-off.












The crown royalties and
freehold production
taxes are deductible for
CIT purposes. 










The corporate income tax
rate is 10 percent and the
tax base matches that of
the federal government.
The CIT rate is 10 percent
and the tax base matches
that of the federal
government.
The corporate income tax
rate is 12 percent and the
tax base matches that of
the federal government.
For conventional oil and gas, the
royalty rate is based on gross
revenue or production and is
sensitive to both the market price
and well productivity. For oil, the
royalty ranges from zero to 40
percent, and for natural gas five
percent to 36 percent. There is also
an initial five percent royalty that
applies in the first 12 months with a
volume cap. 
As for oil sands, a progressive gross
royalty ranging from one to nine
percent applies before payout. It is
creditable against the net royalty
(unused credits are carried forward
at the investment allowance rate).
For conventional oil and gas, the
royalty is based on gross revenue.
The royalty rate differs first by
product category, such as density of
oil or type of gas (i.e., conservation
vs. non-conservation gas) and by
well age (except for heavy oil and
conservation gas). Then the
formulation of the royalty rate for a
given product category differs
between oil and gas. For oil, the
royalty rate is sensitive mainly to
productivity; for gas, the royalty is
sensitive only to price. 
For certain high-cost shale gas
projects, there is a pre-payout two
percent royalty on gross revenue
(refer to next column).
The crown royalty and the freehold
production tax (FPT) on oil and gas
are determined using formulas
containing parameters that are
adjusted monthly by the government.
Both royalty and FPT are sensitive to
price and well productivity and differ
by product in terms of their vintage
and characteristics (e.g., type of
product, well and location). The FPT
is lower than the crown royalty by a
production tax factor (PTF), which
varies by the type of product and
ranges from 6.9 to 12.5 percentage
points. 
For the oil sands only, in
addition to a pre-payout
gross royalty, there is a
net royalty of 25 to 40
percent after payout
depending on the price
level of the oil. 
For certain high-cost
shale gas projects, a
newly introduced net
profit royalty program
with four tiers of royalty
rates applies: a pre-
payout two percent
royalty on gross revenue
and three post-payout
tiers associated with a
royalty that is the greater
of five percent of gross
revenue and a higher
rate of net revenue (i.e.,
15 percent, 20 percent,
or 35 percent, depending
on the tier order). To
reach each of the three











of a basic royalty and a
two-tier net royalty. Note
that unsuccessful
exploration expenditure








of a two-tier gross-
revenue royalty and a
two-tier net royalty
depending on the gross




is disallowed for the
purpose of calculating
the royalty.
The regime consists of
two parts: the ordinary
income tax and a
special tax. The total
marginal tax rate on






The corporate income tax
rate is 14 percent and the
tax base matches that of
the federal government.
The corporate income tax
rate is 16 percent and the
tax base matches that of
the federal government.
The corporate income rate
is 28 percent. Exploration
costs are expensed. A
cash refund is provided for
tax losses resulting from
exploration. Oil production
facilities and pipelines
may be depreciated within
six years with a straight-
line rate up to 16 2/3
percent.
Under the generic offshore oil royalty
structure: a basic royalty is charged
on gross revenues at rates rising
from one to 7.5 percent as
cumulative production rises and
before payout of all the project costs
and the basic gross royalty and the
compounded return allowance are
exhausted.  
The basic royalty is payable over the
entire production period. But after
the payout, it is first creditable
against the Tier-1 net royalty and
further deductible from the base for
Tier-2 royalty.
The revenue-based, or gross royalty
is two-tiered — two percent before
payout and five percent after payout
— and deductible for calculating the
base for the net-revenue royalty. 
Note that regardless of the revenue
and profit level being reached, the
two percent gross royalty applies for
a minimum of 24 months, and the
five percent gross royalty applies for
a minimum of 36 months. This
implies that there is no net royalty, or
rent tax payable for the first five
years after the commencement of
production. 
None
A two-tier net royalty (20
percent and 10 percent),
along with a two-tier
return allowance, applies
after payout. Tier-1 net
royalty applies after all
the project costs and the
basic gross royalty and
the compounded Tier-1
return allowance are
exhausted.  Tier-2 royalty
becomes payable after
the payout of both gross
royalty and Tier-1 net
royalty along with the
Tier-2 return allowance. 
The return allowance is
five percentage points
above LTBR for Tier-1
and 15 points above
LTBR for Tier-2.
The two-tier net royalty
rate is 20 percent and
30 percent, depending
on the net-revenue tier
reached. 
Even after the net
royalties become
payable, only the greater
rate of the five percent of
gross revenue and 20
percent or 35 percent of
the net revenue is
payable. To reach each of





LTBR for Tier-1 and 45
points above LTBR for
Tier-2.
The special tax is 50
percent. The tax base is
the CIT base gross of
financing cost and net of
an uplift (=7.5 percent of




expenditures for the first
four consecutive years)





Jurisdiction Overview Company income tax Royalty Rent-based tax
The regime as applied
to oil and gas fields
that are given
development consent
on or after 16 March




(SC), with a combined
tax rate of 62 percent.
The main tax is the
federal corporate
income tax. There is
also a federal royalty






principal levies in the
state: the severance
tax, the royalty and the







The principal levies are
the income tax and the
severance tax. The
royalty appears to be a









tax is 30 percent. It differs






are all 100 percent
deductible, (2) there is a
100 percent first-year
allowance for all types of
capital except for the
costs of acquiring mineral
assets, which attracts a
10 percent annual relief,
and (3) a 10 percent ring
fence expenditure
supplement for up to six
years.
The corporate income tax
rate is 31.85 percent
since 2010 for “domestic
productive activities”
including oil and gas
business. The E&D




The corporate income tax
rate is progressive with the
top rate being 6.5 percent
on net taxable income
exceeding $100,000.
The CIT rate is 4.63
percent.
None in relation to fields that are
given development consent on or
after 16 March 1993. 
The royalty arising from the federal
properties is 1/8 of the value of
onshore production and 1/6
offshore. But this royalty is beyond
the focus of our study.
The general severance tax is five
percent with a reduced rate of 1.5
percent available to new discovery
gas (for the first two years) and high-
cost gas (for the first three years).
The statutory royalty rate is 1/8 but
a higher royalty rate is possible.
The severance tax is five percent for
oil and gas, four percent for oil shale
but with reduced rates (i.e., one, two
and three percent respectively) for
the first three years of production.
A supplementary charge
of 32 percent on the







* Our compilation is based on various government websites listed below:
Australia http://www.futuretax.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=FactSheets/resource_tax_regime.htm
Brazil http://www.anp.gov.br/brasil-rounds/round4/round4/workshop/restrito/ingles/PartGov-R4I.pdf and 
http://www.anp.gov.br/brasil-rounds/round1/Docs/LDOC02_en.pdf
Canada
For Western Canada http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Tenure/pdfs/FISREG.pdf
For NF&L NF&L royalty regulation:  http://assembly.nl.ca/Legislation/sr/regulations/rc030071.htm#30
For Nova Scotia http://www.gov.ns.ca/energy/resources/ra/offshore/offshore-petroleum-royalty-regime.pdf
Norway http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/taxes-and-duties/bedriftsbeskatning/
Taxation-of-petroleum-activities.html?id=417318
United Kingdom http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/international/ns-fiscal3.htm#f and 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/otmanual/index.htm
United States
For treating E&D http://www.taxalmanac.org/index.php/Internal_Revenue_Code:Sec._167._Depreciation
For depreciable assets http://books.google.com/ then search: Patrick A. Hennessee, "Oil and Gas: Federal Income Taxation”
For state income taxes CCH US Master Multistate Corporate Tax Guide 
Arkansas http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/









stock tax and loan tax.  
Debate is still ongoing




There are three levies
on state-owned
resource properties: a
royalty, a severance tax
(or oil and gas
production taxes) and a
franchise tax. The royalty
is deductible in
calculation of the
severance tax, and both
payments are
deductible for the




The CIT rate is 9.9
percent, the capital stock
tax rate is 0.289 percent,
but will be eliminated by
2014, and the loan tax
rate is 0.4 percent.
The Franchise Tax is one
percent based on the
taxable margin, which is
the least of the following
three calculations: total
revenue minus cost of
goods sold, total revenue
minus compensation, or
total revenue times 70
percent. 
None
The royalty rate is within the range of
16.67 percent and 25 percent. 
The severance tax or production tax
is based on the total production at
market value. The rate is 4.6 percent





In Canada, the oil and gas fiscal regime is comprised of two parts: an income tax system that is
applied to the oil and gas industry along with other industries but with special features
earmarked only to the oil and gas industry, and a provincial royalty system that varies
significantly from province to province.19 Some of these royalty systems include a rent-based
tax in the name of net royalty (see below).  
By focusing on the general settings of provincial royalty regimes, there appear to be two
approaches to such regimes in Canada. 
The first is well established in the three Western provinces where the conventional oil and gas
industry is developed on a well-by-well basis. This approach generally sets a royalty rate based
on gross revenue for every specified product, and such a royalty rate is often sensitive to
market price and well size. 
The second approach follows the rent tax or “cash flow” taxation as recently discussed in the
Australian Henry Report.20 It emerged along with the offshore drilling that developed in the
early 1990s in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland & Labrador. This approach was later used by
Alberta (oil sands) and British Columbia (shale gas) — although each province used its own
distinct framework.   
In the case of Atlantic offshore oil and gas, the royalty system is designed to consist of multi-
tiered net-profit royalty rates along with staged payout definitions and progressive allowances
for rates of return. Also, unlike the treatment under corporate income taxes, the unsuccessful
exploration costs are generally disallowed for royalty purposes. The difference between the
systems in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland & Labrador lies in the degree of complexity. In
Nova Scotia, at each tier, only one royalty rate is virtually accountable for the net royalty
payable and the return allowance is applied without compounding. In contrast, the
Newfoundland & Labrador system requires more complicated calculations for the ultimate
royalty payments: a cumbersome offsetting mechanism between the basic royalty and the two-
tier net royalties and the return allowance with compounding. Note that, compared to the
extremely generous return allowance provided under the Nova Scotia royalty regime (e.g., 20
and 45 percentage points, respectively, above the government long-term bond rate used in
calculating the Tier-1 and Tier-2 net royalty payment), the Newfoundland & Labrador system
appears to be much less excessive (i.e., five and 15 points above LTBR respectively) in this
regard. 
For the oil sands in Alberta, the royalty is based on net revenue after payout and is set to be
price-sensitive, but has no other complexities. Cost deductions are carried forward at the
government bond interest rate as an investment allowance, following the cash flow royalty
model discussed above. In the case of shale gas in BC, an extremely complex net royalty
regime was recently introduced largely following the royalty model of Nova Scotia.
19 Canada also has an incentive for flow-through shares where the federal government and many provinces provide a
personal income tax credit for equity owners to invest in junior oil, gas and mining companies. We do not include
flow-through shares in this analysis as we focus on large companies only.
20 Commonwealth of Australia (2010): Australia’s Future Tax System, Report to the Treasurer, December.
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The corporate income tax in Canada applies the general statutory rate to profits, which is a
combined federal-provincial rate (varying from 25 percent in Alberta and British Columbia to
31 percent in Nova Scotia). Resource companies deduct from corporate taxable income 100
percent of exploration expenditures, 30 percent of development expenditures (on a declining
basis), capital cost allowances for post-production investment expenditures, provincial
royalties, labour and inventory costs.21
The United States
The four states covered in our study are Arkansas, Colorado, Pennsylvania and Texas. With no
attempt to implement tax reform of any kind over the past several decades, there is no rent-
based tax in any of these four states. 
For oil production involving state ownership, there are two principal revenue-based levies: a
state royalty and a state severance tax. Both the royalty and severance taxes are based on the
gross revenue net of transportation cost, and neither of them is sensitive to oil prices.22
Although the royalty and severance taxes are deductible for federal and state income tax
purposes, the mechanism through which royalty and severance tax partially offset one another
differs among the states. For example, in Arkansas, the severance tax is deductible for royalty
purposes while in Texas it is the reverse. Pennsylvania is an outlier since it has not yet targeted
the oil industry specifically for revenue, but has imposed a couple of capital-based taxes in
general.
Under the federal and state corporate income tax legislation, the general amortization period
for exploration and development expenditure incurred by any “major integrated oil company”
is seven years (refer to the US Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 167(h)23). And according to CCH,24
most of the depreciable assets used for oil and gas production fall in the five-year property
class with the US MACRS system.  The federal corporate income tax rate in the United States
is 35 percent, with a reduced rate of 31.85 percent applied to domestic producers including
those in the oil industry, and state corporate income taxes are deductible from the federal tax.  
Australia, Brazil, Norway and the UK 
These four countries are grouped together only because their fiscal regimes all include a profit-
or rent-based tax in addition to company income taxes. But the similarity stops here with
Brazil presenting the most burdensome and complex system, while the other three countries
generally introduced a rent-based tax.  
21 The 2012 Federal Budget phases out the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit of 10 percent for oil, gas and mining
companies by 2015.
22 The severance tax may be reduced for certain newly discovered wells or high-cost wells. But we apply only the
general severance tax rate in our model.
23 Online source: http://www.taxalmanac.org/index.php/Internal_Revenue_Code:Sec._167._Depreciation
24 See Patrick A. Hennessee, “Oil and gas: federal income taxation,” CCH, 2008, page 551-552.
http://books.google.com
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Effective from 1 July 2012, the Australian regime includes only the general corporate income
tax (CIT) and the petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) that is deductible from corporate taxable
income. The state royalties that currently target only oil and gas production are to be creditable
against PRRT. Under the PRRT, all expenditures are immediately expensed and a range of
uplift allowances is applicable against unutilized losses and capital write-offs: 15 percentage
points above the Australian Government long-term bond rate (LTBR) for exploration and five
percentage points above the LTBR for other expenditures. The corporate income tax regime is
similarly structured to that of Canada, with exploration being expensed and development
expenditures written off similar to the treatment of depreciable assets. The corporate income
tax rate is 30 percent (which is to be reduced by one point to 29 percent in 2013-14).
The Brazilian regime consists of multi-layered company income taxes and numerous levies on
oil and gas projects, either at ad valorem rates or by a fixed amount. The corporate income tax
provisions include a combined tax rate of 34 percent, a relatively tight annual allowance for
depreciable assets and full expensing for exploration costs.  The ad valorem levies targeting oil
and gas projects include principally a 10 percent royalty based on the gross revenue, a one
percent landowner fee sharing the royalty base, but on onshore production only, and a
progressive “special participation” (SP) charge of up to 40 percent of the net income. This
special participation charge is applied to a tax base similar to the corporate income tax base in
terms of allowances for various capital expenditures, but includes a complicated scheme
consisting of multiple brackets for taxable volume that vary by type of production, location of
field and years of production. Financing costs are disallowed for SP purposes.
All the non-corporate income tax levies except SP are deductible for SP purposes, and all the
non-corporate income tax levies including SP are deductible for corporate income tax purposes.
The profit-based petroleum taxes in Norway and the UK differ from that of Australia and Brazil
in that they are an add-on tax, rather than being deductible from corporate taxable income.
Accordingly, the tax is called a “special tax” in Norway and a “supplementary charge” in the
UK. While the financing cost under the additional tax is disallowed, a 7.5 percent uplift factor
(up to four years) is provided in Norway to carry forward unused depreciation deductions
including development expenditures. In the UK, the special tax and the ring-fence corporation
tax virtually share the same base as the corporate income tax except for the non-deductibility
of interest costs: all capital expenditures except that for acquiring resource assets may be fully
written off in the year in which they are incurred, and a 10 percent ring-fence expenditure
supplement for up to six years is provided for carrying forward losses associated with
exploration and development costs.  
THE METRR ANALYSIS
By calculating the METRR, we attempt to answer the following comparative questions:
• First, how much do corporate income taxes and royalties impact on oil and gas investment
decisions at the margin across countries?  
• Second, how do the different fiscal levies interact with each other in different ways among
different fiscal regimes?
• And finally, which regime fares better overall on the scale of optimization? 
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For descriptive convenience, we present the METRR in three groups: (1) Canada by province,
(2) the US by state, and (3) the other four countries. We compare the METRRs with marginal
effective tax rates of non-resource industries within each of the 13 jurisdictions to determine
the extent to which the oil industry is comparably taxed or not taxed at the margin. After
providing a base-case analysis, we will disentangle the METRR impact between the effects of
the fiscal levies specifically targeting the oil industry, and the general corporate income taxes
and other taxes affecting capital investment. 
Several technical assumptions are made in our METRR calculations and the corresponding
parameters are provided in Appendix B. Since oil production differs tremendously across
countries, types of product (e.g., offshore vs. onshore) and areas of production, these
assumptions are made only to set a baseline for comparative purposes; they can be adjusted for
tailored policy designs in individual countries. For example, it is assumed in our model that,
according to the distribution of expenditures, the average time required for exploration and
before the commencement of production is five years, while that for development is one year
(these are times that are based on the distribution of expenditures according to Canadian data).
In reality, it might have taken up to 10 years or more to discover an offshore field and more
than five years to develop an oil sands production site. By adjusting this assumption to fit
actual parameters, the METRR results will change and hence indicate whether there is a need
for any specific policy simulations.
For Canada, in responding to the sensitivity to well production and oil price within the three
Western royalty regimes, the METRRs are calculated based on a daily production of oil of 80
barrels and at an average price level of US$76 per barrel (this is calculated by taking a five-
year average of West Intermediate Texas prices, which are discounted relative to international
prices). While the assumption of a daily production is irrelevant to jurisdictions other than the
three Western provinces for conventional oil, the assumption of a price level is important to
convert the revenue-based royalty rate to the profit-based rate that is used in our METRR
model for jurisdictions that impose revenue-based royalties (i.e., Brazil, Canada and the US).
Otherwise, this assumption is irrelevant to jurisdictions where oil-specific levies are rent-based
and insensitive to oil prices. 
In the case of the oil sands royalty, the rent-based royalty rate varies with prices between $55
per barrel (with a royalty rate of 25 percent) to $120 per barrel (with a royalty rate of 40
percent). In principle, the differential royalty rates could influence the overall METRR if the
royalty rate that is applied to costs differs from the royalty rate applied to future resource rents
earned from the marginal investment decision. As we have discussed elsewhere,25 the METRR
is underestimated if the future royalty rate (due to high prices) is higher than the current
royalty rate and vice versa. In our calculations below, we assume that the royalty rate is
unchanging over time — even though this is unlikely to be the case.   
Also, given the complexity of the royalty regimes in the two Atlantic provinces, we provide
METRR calculations only for the case when the second-tier incremental (net) royalty is
payable in Newfoundland & Labrador, and when the first-tier net royalty is payable in Nova
Scotia. This type of assumption is irrelevant to other jurisdictions for METRR calculations. 
25 J. Mintz and D. Chen, “Taxing Canada’s Cash Cow: Tax and Royalty Burdens on the Oil and Gas Industry,” SPP
Briefing Paper, Vol. 3(3), The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, 2010.
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The Base Case 
Table 2 provides effective tax and royalty rates for the oil industry by country and by type of
assets. This calculation is fully based on current tax and royalty provisions as laid out in Table
1 and hence is designated as the “base case.”26
We begin with an analysis of the effective tax rate on the resource sector as a whole by asset
class (Table 2). Table 3 provides further data for analyzing the base case METRR numbers
provided in Table 2. This second set of reference data consists of a comparison between the
resource and non-resource marginal effective tax (and royalty) rates. It also includes data on
statutory tax and royalty rates on gross oil income, taking into account the specific offsetting
mechanism between these taxes and royalties. For example, in Norway and the UK, this
combined tax rate is 78 percent and 62 percent respectively, as their rent taxes are direct add-
ons to the corporate income tax rate. In contrast, Brazil’s combined tax/royalty rate ranges
from 47 percent to 64 percent as the revenue-based royalty (10 percent) is deductible in
calculating the profit-based royalty (ranging from 10 percent to 40 percent), and all the royalty
payments are deductible for income tax purposes. 
Several observations may be drawn from base-case calculations as shown below in Table 2
(with reference to Table 3):
TABLE 2 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATES FOR OIL INDUSTRY BY JURISDICTION (IN PERCENT), 2012,
INCLUDING ALL TAXES AND ROYALTIES
* Assumes that the retail sales tax in BC is restored and the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit for oil and gas activities is fully
phased out as proposed in the 2012 Federal Budget in Canada.
26 As mentioned earlier, Table E2 in Appendix E also provides some critical non-tax parameters.
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Canada*
BC 27.7 32.5 29.5 23.2 30.0
Alberta
Conventional 48.4 51.8 21.9 23.2 40.3
Oil sands -2.9 5.6 33.0 33.1 27.7
Saskatchewan 36.7 41.2 33.7 26.4 37.1
N&L 6.4 -3.3 67.5 32.1 12.9
Nova Scotia -6.9 -16.5 34.5 32.1 0.9
The US
Arkansas 24.0 26.6 35.2 26.2 28.8
Colorado 28.6 30.9 33.2 25.2 30.9
Pennsylvania 4.2 7.7 38.3 28.2 17.5
Texas 31.7 33.8 32.1 23.1 32.4
Australia -133.2 12.9 28.9 38.2 -20.1
Brazil 48.2 49.6 74.0 45.5 57.6
Norway -3.3 14.6 63.7 82.9 28.2
The UK -4.1 -0.8 3.8 71.1 4.6
Exploration Development Depreciable Inventory Aggregate
First, by glancing only at the aggregated METRR, Brazil applies the highest tax and royalty
burden on oil industry with a METRR of 58 percent.27 This is substantially higher than the
marginal effective tax rate on capital in its non-resource industries (32 percent) in Table 3).  
Brazil is distantly followed by Alberta (40 percent for conventional oil) and Saskatchewan
(37 percent). In both cases, non-resource investments at the margin are subject to less taxation
(18 percent in Alberta and 25 percent in Saskatchewan as in Table 3).  
On the other end of the scale, Australian oil and gas investments are subject to the least
taxation at the margin (-20 percent), followed by Nova Scotia (0.9 percent), the UK (five
percent) and Newfoundland & Labrador (13 percent). In these cases, except for Newfoundland
& Labrador, oil and gas investments at the margin are subject to much less taxation than non-
resource investments.  
Those jurisdictions in the middle ground are Texas (32 percent), Colorado (31 percent), British
Columbia (30 percent), Arkansas (29 percent), Norway (28 percent), Alberta (28 percent for the
oil sands) and Pennsylvania (18 percent). We note that oil sands investments bear a higher
marginal effective tax and royalty rate than the marginal effective tax rate in non-resource
sectors (this is a result of interactions between corporate income tax and the rent-based royalty
as discussed in Appendix A). This is very similar to the situation in Norway. In the United
States, oil investments at the margin face a lower tax burden compared to non-resource
industries. (Note that we do not include temporary depreciation allowances in the marginal
effective tax rate calculations.)  
27 This is resulted from the highest net royalty rate of 40 percent, the same rate as that of the rent tax in Australia. By
applying its lowest net royalty rate of 10 percent, the METRR for Brazil’s oil industry would be 38 percent, which is
still above its METR for the non-resource sector. 
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TABLE 3 EFFECTIVE VS. STATUTORY TAX AND ROYALTY RATES BY JURISDICTION (IN PERCENT), 2012
* Assumes that the retail sales tax in BC is restored and the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit is fully phased out. 
** Excluding the fast write-off for mining assets that is still partially available to oil sands but will be completely phased out
for oil sands by 2015.  
Second, among the lowest-taxed regimes, different factors contribute to the negative METRR
to various degrees:
• For Australia, the excessive uplift for exploration expenditure, which is 15 percentage
points above the long-term government bond rate (LTBR), is the main contributor to the
overall negative METRR. That is, with the current LTBR at 3.9 percent, an uplift of 18.9
percent for exploration results in a METRR on exploration below a negative rate of 133
percent. Given the exploration share of 27 percent in total capital investment in the oil
industry, the overall METRR for Australia is -20 percent. By reducing the uplift factor for
exploration from 18.9 percent to 8.9 percent, the latter rate being applicable to development
and other depreciable assets, the METRR for exploration would be about two percent and
the overall METRR of 16 percent, which is a level still well below that for non-resource
sectors in Australia (26 percent).
28 Chen and J. Mintz, “2012 Annual Global Tax Competitiveness Ranking - A Canadian Good News Story,” SPP
Research Papers, 5 (28) September 2012. Note that temporary tax preferences such as tax holidays and bonus
depreciation are excluded in these calculations.
29 The complexity of provincial royalty regimes in Canada requires the following explanatory notes: for BC, the royalty
rate is for a third-tier oil with conventional oil well production above 159m3/month, for Alberta, the rate is for daily
production of 80bbs/day at a price of $76/bbl, for Saskatchewan, the rate includes the 30.1 percent royalty and the
1.7 percent corporation capital tax resource surcharge, for Newfoundland & Labrador, we assume that Tier-2 has
been reached and both Tier-1 and Tier-2 net royalties are payable, and for Nova Scotia, the rate shown is the Tier-2
net royalty rate. For the US, the royalty rate shown in the table is the combined rate of the severance tax and royalty,
taking into account the specific partial offsetting mechanism by state. For Brazil, the combined royalty rates contain
only the 10 percent revenue-based royalty and the profit-based royalty rate ranging from 10 percent to 40 percent,
with the former deductible in calculating the latter. 
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Canada*
BC 30.0 27.7 25 24 43.0
Alberta
Conventional 40.3 17.9 25 40 55.0
Oil sands** 27.7 17.9 25 29 54.0
Saskatchewan 37.1 25.2 27 31.8 50.2
N&L 12.9 11.2 29 30 50.3
Nova Scotia 0.9 7.7 31 35 55.2
The US
Arkansas 28.8 37.2 36.3 16.7 46.9
Colorado 30.9 35.1 35.0 20.8 48.5
Pennsylvania 17.5 40.3 38.6 0 38.6
Texas 32.4 34.2 32.5 23.7 48.5
Australia -20.1 26.2 30 40 58
Brazil 57.6 31.6 34 19-46 46.5-64.4
Norway 28.2 24.5 28 50 78
The UK 4.6 26.7 30 32 62
Effective Tax/Royalty Rate Statutory Tax/Royalty Rates
Oil Industry Non-Resource28 Corporate Royalty/ Combined
Income Rent  Tax/Royalty on 
Tax Rate Tax Rate29 Oil Income
• In Nova Scotia, the provincial return allowance (Tier-1) — 20 percentage points above the
LTBR — contributes another reduction to the METRR of over 10 percentage points. In
other words, by reducing the return allowance to the LTBR, the METRR in Nova Scotia
would be 11 percent, which is about three percentage points higher than that for the non-
resource sector in the province. By allowing unsuccessful exploration expenditures, the
METRR would be about four percent. On the other hand, the METRR for the non-resource
sector would be substantially higher (i.e., 23 percent) should the AITC and the provincial
ITC be also eliminated for the qualified business within the non-resource sector.
• In the UK, the tax regime treats all capital assets except inventories with expensing. This
provision helps reduce the gap in METRR between exploration (normally the least taxed)
and depreciable assets (normally the highest taxed) down to eight percentage points. With
the newly increased ring-fence expenditure supplement of 10 percent (up from the previous
six percent), the application of tax losses associated with exploration and development
expenditures to other income and matching the prescribed rate for carry-forward of
allowance with the risk-inclusive industry discount rate, the resulting METRR for the oil
industry is substantially lower than that for the non-resource sector. 
In Newfoundland & Labrador (N&L), the METRR is about 13 percent, about 2 percentage
points higher than that for its non-resources industries as a whole. This indicates the
absence of a fiscal preference for oil investments in the province unlike the case of Nova
Scotia. Similar to Nova Scotia, N&L provides multi-layer royalty rates and return
allowances and disallows any unsuccessful exploration costs (i.e., dry holes) for royalty
purpose. But the return allowance in N&L is not as substantial as that provided in Nova
Scotia. Moreover, the tiered net royalties in N&L are incremental rather than mutually
offsetting, as in the case of NS. By allowing unsuccessful exploration costs to be deducted
from the royalty base, the METRR for the oil industry would be one percentage point
below that for non-resource sectors in the province. In the meantime, the fiscal subsidy
associated with the return allowance in N&L is still substantial and sufficient to match the
tax preference associated with the AITC provided to the qualified non-resource sectors.30
Third, among the three regimes with high taxes on investments at the margin, each has
distinctive issues.
• For Brazil, the comparatively high company income tax rate (34 percent) and less generous
tax allowance for depreciable assets, most of which depreciate faster in economic terms
than the tax provisions allow, are general contributors to its high METRR for both the oil
industry and the non-resource sectors. Furthermore, Brazil collects both a revenue-based
royalty of 10 percent and a profit-based royalty of up to 40 percent, which are applied in
our model, and the former is only allowed to reduce the base for the latter rather than offset
the latter. Finally, Brazil’s relatively high inflation rate (five percent) has also contributed to
its higher METRR. Should its inflation rate be reduced to Norway’s level of two percent, its
METRR for the oil and gas industry could drop by seven points to 51 percent. 
30 That is, by reducing the return allowance to the LTBR and excluding AITC for non-resource industries, the METRR
for the oil industry and the METR for non-resource industries as a whole would be both around 20 percent in N&L.
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• The METRR for conventional oil in Alberta is also high despite the fact that the province
cut the top royalty rate from 50 percent to 40 percent in 2010. This is because this revenue-
based top rate (40 percent) applies at a moderate price level for wells with moderate
productivity (e.g., at $70/bbl for well productivity of 80 barrels per day). As a result, after
crossing the threshold price of $70/bbl, for a given well productivity (e.g., 80 barrels per
day), the METRR appears to be higher at a moderate price level ($76/bbl) than at possible
higher price levels, say over $100/bbl.
• In Saskatchewan, a unique tax factor is the 1.7 percent resource surcharge, which accounts
for three percentage points of its overall METRR. Other tax factors contributing to the
rather high METRR include the provincial retail sales tax, which adds to the cost of capital
good purchases, the relatively high provincial corporate income rate (12 percent percent vs.
10 percent in Alberta and BC) and a relatively high royalty rate (i.e., over 30 percent at a
modest price of $76/bbl compared to 24 percent in BC, which is insensitive to oil prices).
And finally, on the middle ground occupied by British Columbia, Alberta (oil sands), the four
states in the US and Norway, a common feature is the relative evenness in the METRR across
different types of assets (except for Alberta, Norway and Pennsylvania). 
• In the four states in the US, viewing all taxes and royalties combined, Texas appears to be
the highest-taxed state, followed by Colorado, Arkansas and Pennsylvania. Our subsequent
simulation will show that their revenue-based royalty and severance taxes place a big
portion of the tax burden on the oil industry in these states, except for Pennsylvania where
there is no levy specifically targeting the oil industry.31 On the other hand, because these
levies are based on gross revenue and are insensitive to price, their impact on capital
investment tends to decrease when the oil price rises. 
• The regime in British Columbia for conventional oil is similar to those in the states in terms
of having a revenue-based royalty that is insensitive to oil prices. Therefore, for a given
well productivity, the METRR tends to be higher when the oil price drops.
• In Norway, the 28 percent METRR for its oil industry is slightly higher than that for its
non-resource sector. This is so despite the 50 percent special tax for the oil industry on top
of the regular 28 percent corporate income tax rate that applies to all industries. Two
principal provisions help offset the impact of the seemingly extremely high special tax. One
is the cash refund provided for the loss associated with exploration expenditure. And the
other is the 7.5 percent uplift for depreciating capital investment including development
expenditures. 
• The Alberta regime for oil sands is a rent-based royalty that provides a full deduction for
capital and current costs from the royalty base. Since the regime provides a return
allowance for possible tax losses associated with exploration and development, the
METRRs for exploration and development capital are substantially lower than those on
other assets. 
31 This situation may not last long as there has been a heated debate about whether to introduce a resource-based tax so
as to generate revenue for the state. According to the Wall Street Journal (October 4, 2011, online edition),
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett has proposed a controversial fixed natural-gas drilling fee of $160,000 per well. 
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Table 2 also illustrates that exploration and development expenditures tend to be more
favourably treated than other asset expenditures in the oil and gas industry, except in those
jurisdictions that rely on revenue-based royalties (particularly, Alberta for conventional oil,
British Columbia, Saskatchewan and most US states). Where more preferential treatment is
given, especially for development expenditures, incentives are created to shift capital
expenditure from post-production to the pre-production stage to take advantage of greater tax
savings available under various tax regimes. From the point of view of economic efficiency, it
would be better that a more even distribution of tax burdens fall across assets. However, as
discussed above, the more favourable treatment for exploration could be viewed as appropriate
since such expenditures are related to discovery spillovers, similar to research expenditures that
are provided with significant tax benefits, especially in Canada.
As a final point in this section, we note that the combined statutory corporate income and
royalty rates on gross income vary sharply among the jurisdictions (Table 3). The highest rate
is in Norway (78 percent), followed by the UK (62 percent) and the lowest is Pennsylvania
(38.6 percent). Many of the combined tax and royalty statutory rates are well above the
corporate income tax statutory tax rates for non-resource sectors. These observations raise two
important tax policy issues.  
The first is that resource investments that earn large rents (high internal rates of return on
capital) would pay relatively large tax and royalty payments even if the marginal effective tax
and royalty payments were low. Thus, the Norwegian and UK systems, for example, may
discourage private producers if they can earn similar pre-tax rents elsewhere.  
The second is that very high tax and royalty rates can distort business decisions. They encourage
companies to charge lower transfer prices for their sales to reduce the amount of tax and royalty
paid to host governments. High marginal rates could also discourage risky investments to the
extent that governments do not provide full refundability when losses are incurred. We
particularly note that the royalty regimes in both Newfoundland & Labrador and Nova Scotia
have a rather poor feature in that respect — unsuccessful exploration costs are not deductible,
but the combined corporate income tax and royalty rates (under the first and second tiers) is
above 50 percent. It would be far better to let unsuccessful exploration costs be deducted (with a
carry-forward at a riskless interest rate) as part of a simpler structure with a flat net royalty rate.
Decomposing the impact of taxes and royalties
Table 4 provides further simulations to decompose the effective tax and royalty rate to its
individual tax and royalty sources. Column (A) shows the aggregated marginal effective tax
and royalty rate taken from Table 2. Column (B) differs from Column (A) by excluding all the
fiscal levies targeting only the oil industry, which include royalties, severance taxes (in the
US), rent taxes and the special resource charge (in Saskatchewan). Column (C) further
excludes from Column B other taxes such as sales taxes on capital purchases (in British
Columbia, Saskatchewan and the four states in the US) and the capital-based taxes (in
Pennsylvania); that is, Column (C) presents the impact of only corporate income taxes. As a
comparison, Column (D) presents METRR attributable only to the fiscal levies targeting the oil
industry. Column (E) provides METRR on non-resource sectors as presented in Table 3.
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TABLE 4 DECOMPOSING THE EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATES (IN PERCENT), 2012
* Excludes oil levies and other taxes.
There are four observations that may be drawn from Table 4.
First, excluding all the fiscal levies targeting only the oil industry (Column B) such as
royalties, rent taxes and other oil levies (e.g., the severance tax and the resource surcharge), the
oil industry is taxed lower in all jurisdictions, except for the oil sands in Alberta, compared to
the non-resource sector as a whole (Column E). This is mainly attributable to the more
favourable treatment of exploration and development expenditures, which account for a far
greater share of investment expenditures in the oil industry (over 64 percent), compared to
research and development expenditures in the non-resource sector (below five percent).32
While preferential treatment of exploration and development compared to other asset
expenditures results in less neutral corporate tax, it is comparable to tax support given to
research and development. Both preferences are supported for the reasons given above —
companies would not otherwise fully appropriate the return on their discovery investments.
This is especially the case for research and exploration. However, the tax support given for
development for both resource and non-resource companies undertaking exploration or
research is more questionable in terms of its normative basis.
For the oil sands, the combined capital share in favourably treated exploration and
development is much smaller (18 percent vs. 64 percent for conventional and offshore oil
investment). Furthermore, depreciable assets used for the oil sands, which account for 80
percent of oil-sands capital, are taxed much higher than their counterparts used for non-
resource sectors.33
32 As noted above, the federal Atlantic Investment Tax Credit also provides support to investments in agriculture,
fishing, forestry, mining, oil and gas and manufacturing industries. However, the AITC provides no benefit to service
and construction sectors in the Atlantic. The AITC is being phased out for mining, oil and gas investments.  
33 This is because the combined depreciation allowance for depreciable assets used for oil sands roughly matches its
economic depreciation rate. In contrast, the combined depreciation allowance for depreciable assets used for non-
resource sectors are much higher than their economic depreciation rate.  
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Canada
British Columbia 30.0 11.1 8.6 19.1 27.7
Alberta
Conventional 40.3 8.6 8.6 32.1 17.9
Oil sands 27.7 19.4 19.4 0.0 17.9
Saskatchewan 37.1 10.4 9.3 28.7 25.2
N&L 12.9 8.6 8.6 7.1 11.2
Nova Scotia 0.9 4.1 4.1 -4.8 7.7
The US
Arkansas 28.8 16.0 13.2 13.5 37.2
Colorado 30.9 15.2 12.6 16.7 35.1
Pennsylvania 17.5 17.5 14.3 0.0 40.3
Texas 32.4 14.4 11.5 19.0 34.2
Australia -20.1 19.1 19.1 -58.5 26.2
Brazil 57.6 23.7 23.7 46.7 31.6
Norway 28.2 6.3 6.3 16.5 24.5
The UK 4.6 -6.5 -6.5 4.4 26.7
Incl. Excl. Incl. Reference:
All Fiscal Oil Levies CIT Only* Only METRR for
Levies Oil Levies non-resource
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Second, in Australia and Nova Scotia, the METRR, including all fiscal levies (Column A), is
lower than that excluding oil levies (Column B). This indicates that their royalty regimes
actually provide further tax relief to the oil industry, in addition to the aforementioned
favourable treatment under the corporation income tax. This further tax preference is a direct
result of the excessive return allowances provided in these two jurisdictions under the oil
levies: the 15 percentage points above LTBR in Australia and 20 points or more in Nova
Scotia.
Third, other taxes such as the conventional sales tax and capital-based tax (in Pennsylvania
only) increase the tax burden by about three percentage points in most jurisdictions where such
taxes exist (i.e., BC, Saskatchewan and the four states in the US). But such taxes affect the cost
of capital in the non-resource sector as well.
Finally, an important issue is whether oil investments are taxed less lightly at the margin
compared to other industries. To the extent that fossil fuel subsidies exist, capital will be
allocated to oil investments rather than to other investments in the non-resource sector of that
jurisdiction. Our analysis suggests a mixed answer to that question. At present, oil investments
are more heavily taxed under tax and royalty regimes than non-resource sectors in Alberta,
British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland & Labrador to a less degree, as well as
Brazil and Norway. In other cases, oil investments are more favourably taxed, resulting in more
capital being allocated to these industries compared to a more neutral system.
CONCLUSION
The above METRR analysis illustrates that a clean rent-based tax is the most efficient tax in
that it imposes no tax burden at the margin. By clean, we mean that all the costs incurred by
the oil producer would be expensed or carried over at a return allowance matching a riskless
financing cost, with offsets provided to avoid interactions with the corporate income tax.
Overall, the Alberta royalty tax base used for the oil sands is the closest to the rent-based
royalty regime. By excluding its price sensitivity, the Alberta royalty regime can be a rent-tax
model for other countries to follow.
With respect to the corporate income tax, we are of the view that it could be made more neutral
by scaling back some tax preferences. While expensing of exploration costs is desirable to
compensate for informational spillovers, some questions arise for preferential treatment given
for the development costs of discovery investments.
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APPENDIX Aa
INTERACTION OF CASH FLOW ROYALTY WITH CORPORATE INCOME TAX:
BASIC MODEL FOR NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES34
A resource firm maximizes the present value of cash flows from its project, subject to the
constraint that the extracted resources are equal to the amounts discovered over time. Let T be
the period in which reserves have been discovered and prepared for extraction that begins at
that time.  
(1) Max V = ∑O∞ (1+R)-tCFt dt  
(2) subject to  ∑T∞ Qtdt = X = ∑0T f[et]  (accumulated reserves equals total extraction)
with   CFt =  PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t - TAXc[t] – TAXR[t] for t ≥ T
CFt =  – et (1+π)t - Tc[t] for  t≤T
V is the present value of the firm’s nominal cash flows CF, discounted by the nominal
financing rate R over the lifetime of the firm’s project. The nominal cost of finance is the
weighted average of debt and equity finance (R= Bi(1-u)+(1-B)ρ) used by the firm for all of its
projects, adjusted for the deductibility of interest expense.  
C(Qt,Kt) are current costs that are strictly joint convex in output 
Q (denoted as CQ>0 and CQQ>0) and capital that reduces costs (denoted as CK<0 and CKK<0).
Kt = depreciable capital stock
kt = new investment = Kt+1 - Kt
δ = economic depreciation
f[et] = reserves found through spending on exploration in period t with the function 
being strictly concave in expenditure on exploration and development 
(f’>0 and f”<0)
TAXc[t] = corporate tax payments (paid in each period and can be negative)
TAXR[t] = royalty payments in each period t (only paid after extraction begins)
Pt = nominal price of output normalized to one and rises at the same inflation rate as 
other prices (Pt = PO(1+π)t
34 A similar version to this is published in K. MacKenzie and J. Mintz, “The Myths and Facts of Fossil Fuel Subsidies:
A Critique of Existing Studies,” SPP Research Paper, 4(14), The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary,
2011.
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The analysis below incorporates corporate income taxes and royalty payments based on
revenues and cash flows. Corporate tax is imposed on the revenues earned from the sale of
resources net of the costs of production, which include current extraction costs, capital costs
allowances and exploration and development costs (exploration is expensed but development is
capitalized and written off at the declining balance rate σ). This implies the following:
(3) TAXc[t] = u{PtQt- C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t - αDt - σEt(1+π)t - TR[t]}
(4) Dt = (δKs+ks)(1+π)t – αDt-1 
(5) Et = et(1+π)t – σEt-1
(6) with α = capital cost allowance rate, Ds = the undepreciated capital cost base and 
Es = the undepreciated “stock” of exploration and development spending at time s.  
Manipulating the terms associated with capital cost allowances and investment, (δKt+kt)(1+π)t,
in equation (1) with the insertion of terms in (3), (4) and (5), one can show that the investment
costs are reduced by the present value of capital allowances so that:
CFt = {P0Qt-C(Qt,Kt)}(1-u)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1-uZ)(1+π)t – TAXR[t](1-u) 
for t ≥ T
CFt = – et(1-uZ’)(1+π)t – TAXR[t](1-u)  for  t < T
with Z = α/(α+R)  and  Z’=σ/(σ+R)35
Note that royalty payments in the exploration and development phase are negative if such costs
are deductible from the royalty base, which will be the case for the rent tax. 
Revenue-Based Royalty
Revenue-based royalties are a percentage of the value of extracted output, and the corporate
income tax system allows companies to deduct exploration and development expenses against
other income earned. Let τ be the ad valorem payment on sales, PQ, so that TR = τPQ
(suppressing time scripts here on in unless needed). Maximizing equation (1), subject to (2)
and (2’), choosing Q, K, k, and E, yields the following:
OUTPUT DECISION
The choice of Q yields the following result (λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint in (2)):
(7) (1+r)-t(P(1-τ)- CQ)(1-u) = λ36
with  r =  R – π = Bi(1-u)+(1-B)ρ – π
35 For an explicit derivation, see Jack Mintz, “Corporate Tax Holidays and Investment,” World Bank Economic Review,
Vol 4, No. 2, 81-102, 1990.
36 The implied Hotelling Rule — the capital gain in holding the asset in the ground is equal to the real net-of-corporate
tax cost of finance — is derived by using the first-order conditions from equation (8) for two time periods:
[(pt+1- pt)(1-τ) – (CQ,t+1- CQ,t)]/ {pt(1- τ) - CQ,t}. = r.
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The shadow price of extracted output is equal to the marginal value of extracting a marginal
unit of output. The royalty rate on ad valorem sales generally reduces quasi-rents and the
incentive to extract, since the royalty reduces revenues relative to costs of extraction. On the
other hand, the deductibility of interest expense from taxable income lowers the cost of finance
and, therefore, increases extraction to early periods.
DEPRECIABLE CAPITAL 
The choice of capital stock and new investment, post-exploration and development, as well as
the undepreciated capital cost base and changes to it, yields the following cost of capital for
depreciable capital:
(8) -CK =  (δ+R-π)(1-uZ)/(1-u) 
This is the familiar cost of capital expression, noting that R is the weighted average of the cost
of debt and equity finance and Z is the present value of depreciation. 
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The choice of exploration and development, e, yields the following for the cost of capital:
(9) (PT–CQ1T)ft’ = (1-uZ’)(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u){1- τP/(P –CQ)}]
The quasi-rent earned by investing in exploration (PT–CQ1T)ft’ is equal to the interest-inclusive
cost of exploration (the price of exploration and development is set equal to unity) divided by
the one minus the royalty imposed on the cost of capital. The term in the denominator
τP/(P –C’) is the ad valorem tax paid as a share of the quasi-rents on incremental sales (this is
expected to be less than one so long as the ad valorem tax rate is less than the margin
(P –C’)/P). The cost of exploration is reduced by interest deductions taken early at time t
relative to the earning of income at time T. Given the deductibility of interest expense from
income, the effect of corporate taxation is to reduce the real cost of finance (r) and the discount
factor (1+r)(T-t) resulting in a lower cost of capital (and lower effective tax rate on capital).
Rent-Based Royalty on Cash Flows
Cash flow is equal to the revenues net of both current and capital costs incurred in undertaking
the project. Interest expense is not deductible and unused deductions, fully written off in later
years, are carried forward at the riskless bond rate (the uplift factor).  
The royalty payment after payout is the following:
TR = τ[PtQt- C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t - (δKt+kt)(1+π)t - et(1+π)t]
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Which is substituted into equation (3). The determination of output, Q, accords with the
following Euler equation:
(10) (1+r)-t(1-τ)(P-CQ)(1-u) = λ
DEPRECIABLE CAPITAL
The user cost for depreciable capital for the oil sands case is similar to equation (9), but
royalties directly affect the cost of capital because current costs are deductible from the royalty
base. That is, changes in the stock of capital reduce current costs, which are netted from
royalty payments. 
(11) -CK =  (δ+R-π){1- τ(1-u) - uZ)}/[(1-u)(1-τ)] 
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The user cost for exploration and development for the cash flow tax is the following:
(12 (PT–CQ1T)ft’ = (1-uZ’ –τ(1-u))(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u)(1-τ)]
If the corporate tax terms are zero (u=0 and Z=1), the royalty terms appearing in equations (12)




TAX AND NON-TAX PARAMETERS FOR THE METRR MODEL
This appendix provides tax and non-tax parameters for the variables used in our model for
calculating marginal effective tax and royalty rates (METRR) by country (see Appendices
C-E). We first present a list of these variables with their definitions, and then provide tax
parameters in Table B1 and non-tax parameters in Table B2. 
List of Variables in the METRR Model:
r = real financing cost = R - π, with 
R = nominal financing cost = βi(1-Uc)+(1-β) where 
i = nominal interest rate, 
β = debt-to-assets ratio, 
Uc = regular CIT rate, and 
ρ = cost of equity = i(1-m)/(1-c), with 
m = the G-7 average personal income tax (PIT) rate on interest income 
c = the G-7 average PIT rate on equity income = weighted average of PIT rate on
dividends and that on capital gains assuming a 40 percent distribution
Rg = gross-of-tax return to capital
T-t = time to build = five years for exploration and one year for development, where T is 
the point of the commencement of production
T’-T = average number of years from commencement of production to payout 
= five years, where T’ is the point of payout, hence
T’-t = T’-T + T-t = total number years from the year of investment to year of payout
u = the sum of Uc and Us
Uc = the corporate income tax (CIT) rate
Us = the supplementary tax that shares the CIT base in general (for Norway and the UK)
Z’ = the present value of allowances for exploration or development
Z = the present value of capital cost deductions for depreciable capital: 
Z’ = α/(α+R) for declining-base methods and Z = (1+R)α/R[(1+R)1/α -1]/(1+R)1/α
for straight-line methods, with α = depreciation allowance
ψu = the uplifting factor under both uc and us (for the UK only)
ψs = the present value of the four-year uplifting factor under us (for Norway only)
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τ = profit based royalty (Brazil) or rent tax (Australia and the UK)
Z’
τ
= the present value of allowances for exploration or development under the profit- 
based royalty (Brazil) or rent tax (Australia and the UK), Z
τ
=1 for exploration in 
Brazil and for both exploration and development in Australia and the UK
ψ
τ
= the uplifting factor under the rent tax (Australia only)
g = revenue-based royalty that is deductible for profit-based royalty (Brazil only)
(P-C’)/P  =  rent to gross income ratio
TABLE B1 TAX PARAMETERS BY COUNTRY, 2012
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Uc = Uf + Up with Uf =15% 25% 25% 27% 29% 31%
Us None None None None None
g Varying Varying Varying Progressive 2-tier
τ Varying* Varying** None Varying 2-tier
No uplift or return allowance for income taxes
ψτ for Exploration Varying* LTBR** NA 2-tier 2-tier
ψτ for Development Varying* LTBR** NA 2-tier 2-tier
ψτ for Depreciable Varying* LTBR** NA 2-tier 2-tier
*  For shale oil only.          **   For oil sands only.
CANADA BC Alberta Saskatchewan N&L N.S.
Uc = Uf (1- Us)+Us with Uf =31.85% 36.3% 35.0% 38.6% 32.5%
Us = state CIT rate 6.5% 4.63% 9.9% 1.0%
g* 17% 21% None 24%
τ None None None None
No uplifting allowance of any kind
* This is a combined rate for both severance tax and royalty taking into account the partial offsetting mechanism between
the two.
The US Arkansas Colorado Pennsylvania Texas
u = Uc + Us 30% 34% 78% 62%
Uc 30% 34% 28% 30%
Us None None 50% 32%
g None 11% None None
τ 40% Varying None None
ψu for Exploration None None See Table 1 10%
ψu for Development None None See ψs 10%
ψu for Depreciable None None See ψs None
ψs for Exploration NA NA See Table 1 10%
ψs for Development NA NA 7.5%, 4 years 10%
ψs for Depreciable NA NA 7.5%, 4 years None
ψτ for Exploration LTBR+15% None NA NA
ψτ for Development LTBR+5% None NA NA
ψτ for Depreciable LTBR+5% None NA NA
The Other Four Australia Brazil Norway The UK
TABLE B2 NON-TAX PARAMETERS BY COUNTRY, 2012
* Our estimate based on CPI for 2005-11, published by the World Bank up to 2010 and The Economist for 2011.
** Adopted from our Canadian model and applied across borders.
*** It is the sum of the country-specific inflation rate and the cross-border real interest rate.
**** Based on The Economist, Jan 21st, 2012, Economic and Financial Indicators.
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π* 3.3% 5.1% 2% 2.1% 2.9% 2.4%
LTBR**** 3.85% NA 2.06% NA NA NA
Commonly shared non-tax parameters
ir** 3.8%






Average time to build:
T-tE 5-year
T-tD 1-year









Australia Brazil Canada Norway The UK The US
APPENDIX C
THE CANADIAN OIL METRR MODEL
This appendix presents key equations for estimating the marginal effective tax and royalty rate
(METRR) for the oil industry in Canada. Table 1 in the text provides a summary of the oil
fiscal regime by province. Appendix B provides a list of definitions and two tables of specific
parameters (Tables B1 and B2) for the variables that appear in the METRR equations below.
The five provinces covered in our model are British Columbia (BC), Alberta (AB),
Saskatchewan (SAS), Nova Scotia (NS) and Newfoundland & Labrador (N&L). 
The general oil and gas fiscal regime in Canada is comprised of two parts: an income tax
system that taxes the oil and gas industry along with other industries under the same umbrella,
but with earmarked features that are applicable only to the oil and gas industry, and a
provincial royalty system that varies significantly from province to province. 
Due to the diversity and complexity among the provincial oil royalty regimes, there is no
generic model that applies to Canada as a whole. We therefore present the METRR model for
calculating the gross-of-tax rate of return, or Rg, below, province by province. The equations
are numbered in the order of their presentation.
The basic assumption for our calculation of METRR in Canada is: the daily production of oil is
80 barrels and the oil price is $76/bbl. This assumption does not apply in the case of offshore
drilling. The assumed price level does determine the royalty rate applied to our calculation of
METRR for the oil sands.
Note that in most cases, we provide an identical equation for exploration and development
(E&D), but this does not mean that exploration (CEE, or Canadian exploration expenditure)
and development (CDE) incur the same METRR. The fact that CEE and CDE are treated
differently under the income taxes — CEE is expensed and CDE is allowed a 30 percent write-
off annually — determine that they incur very different METRRs.
ALBERTA
Alberta collects royalty from its conventional oil and gas sector based on gross revenue, and that
from its oil sands based on net revenue after the payout point. The royalty rate ranges from 15 to
40 percent for conventional oil and from 25 to 40 percent for the post-payout oil sands project.
FOR CONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS:
For depreciable assets:
(1) Rg = (δ+R-π)(1-uZ)/(1-u) - δ
For inventory:
(2) Rg = (R–π(1-u))/(1-u)
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For E&D:
(3) Rg = (1-uZ’)(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u){1- τP/(P –CQ)}]
FOR OIL SANDS:
For depreciable assets:
(4) Rg = (δ+R-π){1- τ(1-u) - uZ)}/[(1-u)(1-τ)] - δ
For inventory:
(5) Rg = ((R- π)(1- τ (1-u))+uπ)/[(1-u)(1-τ)].
For E&D:
(6) Rg = (1-uZ’ –τ(1-u))(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u)(1-τ)]
BRITISH COLUMBIA
For conventional products, the royalty rate applies to the gross revenue. The formulation of
royalty differs between oil and gas. For oil, the royalty is sensitive to both the age and
production by well; for gas, the royalty is sensitive only to the price level. 
For depreciable assets: 
(7) Rg = (δ+R-π)(1-uZ)(1+κ)/(1-u) – δ, with κ = effective PST rate
For inventory: 
(8) Rg = (R–π(1-u))/(1-u)
For E&D:
(9) Rg = (1-uZ’)(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u){1- τP/(P –CQ)}]
SASKATCHEWAN
The tax and royalty regime in Saskatchewan is similar to that in BC for conventional oil and
gas. The only addition is a 1.7 percent resource surcharge applicable to the sales value of oil
and gas. 
For depreciable assets:
(10) Rg = (δ+R-π)(1-uZ)(1+κ)/[(1-u)(1-s)] - δ, with s = the resource surcharge 
For inventory: 
(11) Rg = [R–π(1-u)]/[(1-u)(1-s)]
For E&D:
(12) Rg = (1-uZ’)(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u)(1- τP/(P –CQ))(1-s)]
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NOVA SCOTIA
For NS, we assume “if Tier-1 is only reached” when the royalty payable is the greater of five
percent of gross revenue and 20 percent of net revenue (refer to NS “royalty regulation”). 
For depreciable assets: 
(13) Rg = (δ+R-π){(1-uZ)- τ1(1-u)}/[(1-u)(1-τ1)] - δ
For inventory:
(14) Rg = [(R–π)(1- τ1) + πu]/[(1-u)(1-τ1)] 
For exploration: 
(15) Rg = (1+r)T {1-uZ’- ωτ1(1-u)(1+ψ1-R)T1-t)}/ [(1-u)(1-τ1)] 
with ω = the ratio of successful CEE allowed for royalty purpose = 60 percent.
For development: 
(16) Rg = (1+r)T {1-uZ’- τ1(1-u)(1+ψ1-R)T1-t)}/ [(1-u)(1-τ1)]
NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
Newfoundland and Labrador presents one of the most complicated royalty regimes in Canada.
It is similar to the net royalty regime in Nova Scotia in terms of its multi-tier royalty rates
along with layered return allowances and disallowing the unsuccessful exploration
expenditures. The main differences between the N&L royalty regime and that of NS are the
following: (1) after the simple payout, the multi-tier royalties in N&L are payable in an
additive manner (albeit with a crediting and deductible mechanism) while that in NS provides
the basis for singling out the greater amount to be payable; and (2) the return allowance in
N&L is calculated in a compounding manner while that in NS is non-compounding.
For depreciable assets invested in t<T1
(17) Rg = {(δ+R-π)[(1-uZ) – τ1(1-u)(δ+π)(1+ψ1-R)T1-t -τ2(1-u)(δ+π)(1+ψ2-R)T2-t]}/Y - δ
with Y = [1-τ1(1+ψ1-R)T1-t -τ2(1+ψ2-R)T2-t)](1-u)
For depreciable assets invested in T1<t<T2
(18)  Rg = {(δ+R-π)[(1-uZ) – τ1(1-u)-τ2(1-u)(δ+π)(1+ψ2-R)T2-t]}/Y
with Y = [1-τ1-τ2(1+ψ2-R)T2-t)](1-u)
For depreciable assets after T2 is reached 
(19)  Rg = (δ+R-π){(1-uZ) - (τ1+ τ2)(1-u)}/((1-u)(1-τ1-τ2)) - δ
For exploration,
(20)   Rg = (1+r)T-t {1-u- ωτ2(1-u)(1+ψ2-R)T2-t- ωτ1(1-u)(1+ψ1-R)T1-t}/((1-u)(1-τ1-τ2))
For development, 
(21) Rg = (1+r)T-t {(1-uZ’) - τ2(1-u)(1+ψ2-R)T2-t- τ1(1-u)(1+ψ1-R)T1-t}/((1-u)(1-τ1-τ2))
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APPENDIX D
THE US OIL METRR MODEL
The US METRR model for oil and gas covers the four main oil producing states: Arkansas,
Colorado, Pennsylvania and Texas. Table 1 in the text summarizes the oil and gas fiscal
regimes in these four states.
The general oil and gas fiscal regime in the US is relatively simple compared to that in Canada.
There are three main taxes and a royalty combining both the federal and state levies: a federal
income tax, a state income tax, a royalty levy depending on the ownership of the property and
a state severance tax. Both royalty and severance tax are based on gross revenue net of
transportation cost, and neither of them is sensitive to oil prices.37 Although both the royalty
and severance tax are deductible for income tax purposes, the mechanism through which
royalty and severance tax partially offset one another differs among the states. 
The main issue here is how to interpret and model the geological and geophysical expenses as
defined by the US Internal Revenue Services. The geological and geophysical expenses in the
US are the counterparts of CEE and CDE in Canada. By referring to the US Internal Revenue
Code, Sec. 167(h),38 it is clear that:
“For tax years ending after August 8, 2005, any geological and geophysical
expenses paid or incurred in connection with the exploration for, or
development of, oil or gas within the United States (as defined in Code Sec.
638) may be amortized ratably over the 24-month period beginning on the
date the expenses are paid or incurred. The amortization of these costs uses
the half-year convention. That is, any payment incurred during the tax year is
treated as paid or incurred on the mid-point of the tax year. This is the sole
method for recovery of domestic geological and geophysical expenditures.”39
Note that, as required by a special rule (see Sec. 167(h)(5)),40 the general amortization period
of 24 months is extended to seven years for any “major integrated oil company.”
We therefore model the exploration and development expenses equally as being amortized
within seven years based on the original cost with a half-year convention. In the US model, to
preserve compatibility with the treatment in Canadian provinces, we assume all the resources
are owned by the state so as to ignore the fact that a large portion, if not the majority, of
resource properties are owned by the private sector. This assumption also ignores the federal
royalty that is payable on property owned by the federal government. 
Two final notes concern the classification of depreciable assets and the effective state sales tax.
37 The severance tax may be reduced for certain new discovery wells or high-cost wells. But we apply only the general
severance tax rate in our model.
38 Online source: http://www.taxalmanac.org/index.php/Internal_Revenue_Code:Sec._167._Depreciation
39 See Patrick A. Hennessee, "Oil and Gas: Federal Income Taxation,” CCH, 2008, Chapter 9, page 147.
http://books.google.com
40 Online source: http://www.taxalmanac.org/index.php/Internal_Revenue_Code:Sec._167._Depreciation
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To single out the tax impact, the classification of capital cost allowance (CCA) for and the
corresponding capital weights of depreciable assets used in the Canadian oil and gas model are
adopted in the US oil and gas model. All these CCA classes, except for Class 41, exist in our
US non-resource model 2010, which has been reconciled with the treatment by the Canadian
Department of Finance. Therefore, the tax depreciation rate by asset class for manufacturing
industry used in the US non-resource model is adopted in the US oil and gas model. Regarding
Class 41, a capital class covering a broad range of assets used only by the resource sector in
the Canadian CCA system, we assume it is a five-year property in the US MACRS system.
This assumption is based on the finding of Hennessee: “Most oil and gas exploration,
production, refining, and marketing equipment falls in the five-year property class.”41 We
therefore modelled Class 41 as a five-year property following the corresponding MACRS
approach with the half-year convention.
As for the effective state sales tax rate by class, the national average effective tax rate by class
is first taken from our 2010 US non-resource model. The state effective sales tax rate by class
is then estimated by multiplying the national counterpart by a factor of X/6, where X = the
individual state statutory sales tax rate (combining both the state and sub-state sales tax rates)
and 6 is the nationwide mode rate. For Class 41, which is used only by resource sectors, its
national average effective sales tax rate is assumed to be the average of those for Classes 1 and
43. This is the same assumption for estimating the effective sales tax rate on Class 41 used in
our Canadian oil and gas model for provinces where an un-harmonized provincial sales tax
exists (e.g., British Columbia and Saskatchewan).
The US METRR Model
For exploration and development:
(1)  Rg = (1+r)T(1-uZ’) / {[1-τ’P/(P-CQ)](1-U)}  
With Z’ = present value of accumulated amortization allowance, τ’ = τ +S (1- τ) where
τ = “statutory” royalty rate and S = severance tax rate, or τ’ = S + τ (1-S) depending on the
specific state, and (P-CQ)/P = rent to gross income ratio
For depreciable assets:
(2)  Rg = (1+t)(r + δ)[1-uZ+k(1-u)/(R+α)]/(1-u) - δ
With t = effective state sales tax, u = Uf (1-Us) + Us, Z = present value of the accumulated
depreciation allowance, k = capital based tax rate,42 and α = the annual depreciable allowance. 
For inventory:
(3) Rg = (r +0.5*Uπ) / (1-U)+k
It is assumed that 50 percent of firms are using FIFO and the rest LIFO. 
[Note: The previous information shows that in the US, oil companies all use LIFO. But considering that the US is switching to
FIFO completely, we keep the 50 percent assumption for now.]




AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, NORWAY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
THE GENERIC METRR MODEL
This appendix presents a generic model that includes key equations for estimating the marginal
effective tax and royalty rate (METRR) for Australia, Brazil, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
Owing to the significant variation among the fiscal regimes in these four countries, certain
variables included in this generic model may be relevant to only one regime or two, and hence
are set to be zero for the others. Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B provide specific numbers, by
country, for all the variables that appear in this generic model.
For exploration and development: 
(1) Rg =(1+r)T-t{1-uZ’(1+ψu-R)T’-t - usZ’ψs - τ(1-u)Z’(1+ψτ-R)T’-t}/[(1-gP/(P-CQ))(1-τ)(1-u)]
For depreciable assets:
(2) Rg = (δ+R-π)[(1 - uZ - usZψs - τ(1-u)Zτ(1+ψτ -R)(T’-T)/2]/ [(1-τ)(1-u)] - δ
Where (T’-T)/2 indicates the average number of years for depreciable assets to be written off
for tax purposes. That is, it is assumed that depreciable assets take a shorter period to be
written off compared to exploration expenses, given that the Australian PRRT regime requires
exploration expenditures to be the last cost item to be written off for tax purposes.
For inventory: 
(3) Rg = [r (1-τ(1-u)) + πu] / [(1 - τ)(1-u)]
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